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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF NON-PRICING STRATEGIES ON
THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY ROLE OF
TURKISH BANKS
Kara, Mahmut
M.S., Department of Management
Supervisors: Assoc. Prof. Suheyla Ozyldrm
May 2010
This thesis aims to explore the eects of the availability of network branches
on the intermediation performance of deposit banks in Turkey. Banks' in-
termediation performance was measured by their ability to attract loans and
deposits. The variations of non-pricing behavior among large scaled versus
small scaled banks and public versus private banks were also analyzed. Panel
generalized method of moment was used with quarterly panel data between
the years 2003 and 2008. Empirical ndings reveal that there exist a positive
and signicant relationship between all deposit banks' intermediation perfor-
mance and their branch network decisions. Results also conrmed that by
having larger branch networks especially for large scaled, small scaled and
private deposit banks signicantly increase their deposits ans loans during
the sample period. However, we couldn't nd any association between the
nancial intermediation performance and branch network size of the public
banks. Overall, the ndings suggest that branch network decisions play a
iii
critical role for deposit banks' performance. Considering recent competition
among banks in Turkey, we expect that branching strategies and other non-
pricing strategies of the banks will matter more in the future.
Keywords: Banking, Competition, Non-Pricing Behavior, Branch Network,
Deposits and Loans.
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OZET
TURK BANKALARININ F_IYAT DISI
STRATEJ_ILER_IN_IN F_INANSAL ARACILIK
FAAL_IYETLER_INE ETK_ILER_I
Kara, Mahmut
Yuksek Lisans, _Isletme Bolumu
Tez Yoneticisi: Doc. Dr. Suheyla Ozyldrm
Mays 2010
Bu tez, mevduat bankalarnn sube aglarnn, nansal araclk faaliyeti per-
formanslarna etkilerinin ortaya ckarlmasn amaclamaktadr. Bankalarn
performanslar, kredi verme ve mevduat toplama kabiliyetleri ile olculmustur.
Ayrca, buyuk olcekli bankalarla kucuk olcekli bankalarn ve kamu bankalar
ile ozel mevduat bankalarnn yat ds davranslarndaki farkllklar da analiz
edilmistir. 2003 ile 2008 yllar arasn kapsayan ceyrek donem panel verileri ile
panel GMMmethodu kullanlmstr. Ampirik sonuclar, mevduat bankalarnn
nansal araclk faaliyeti performanslaryla sube ag kararlar arasnda pozitif
ve anlaml bir iliski oldugunu ortaya koymustur. Ayrca sonuclar, calstgmz
donem icin, buyuk olcekli, kucuk olcekli ve ozel sermayeli mevduat bankalar
icin sube ag genisledikce toplanan mevduatn ve kredi arznn artacagn
da dogrulamstr. Ancak, ampirik sonuclar, kamu bankalarnn sube ag
buyuklukleri ile nansal araclk faaliyeti performanslar arasnda istatistiksel
acdan anlaml sonuclar olmadgn gostermistir. Sonuc olarak, sube ag karar-
v
lar, mevduat bankalar acsndan kritik bir rol oynamaktadr. Turkiyedeki
bankalar arasnda son yllardaki rekabet goz onune alndgnda, bankalarn
subelesme ve diger yat ds stratejilerinin daha onemli hale gelecegi beklen-
mektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Bankaclk, Rekabet, Fiyat Ds Davranslar, Sube Ag,
Mevduatlar ve Krediler.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Banks are providing nancial services to rms and consumers. Banks also
have the intermediation function for holding and exchanging nancial assets.
They enable protable investments by collecting deposits and lending loans.
Recent studies show that institutional and nancial structures of banks and
their roles in the economy are important for economic growth and social
welfare (King and Levine (1993), Levine (1995, 1997), Demirguc-Kunt et
al. (2004)). When banking system does not work well there is potential for
nancial instability (Borth, Caprio, Levine, 2004).
Using bank level data and applying Panzar and Rose (1987) methodology,
Claessens and Laeven (2004) calculated H statistics for 50 countries includ-
ing Turkey to identify their market structure. They found that H statistics
varies generally between 0.60 and 0.80 which suggests that monopolistic com-
petition was the best description of the degree of competition in a banking
sector. In the monopolistically competitive markets, both the pricing and
non-pricing behaviors stimulate dierentiations among the banks. In a com-
petitive market structure, banks, in general, try to dierentiate themselves
to obtain higher market share and increase their market power to earn more
prots. Banks may distinguish themselves in many ways: It may be reputa-
tion, product dierentiation and extensiveness and location of their branch
1
networks (Northcott, 2004).
Yayla (2005) showed that asset concentration ratio1 in Turkish banking
sector began to increase after 2000 suggests less competition after crisis, how-
ever, it stabilized around 0.6 which suggests monopolistic competition in the
sector during the period 2003 to 2008. Turkish banking sector changed sig-
nicantly in this period. More precisely, there have been privatization eorts
for the public banks, mergers and acquisitions of both public and private
banks, excessive foreign bank entries and also introduction of new rules and
regulations to the sector. Thus, the competition in the market has been more
aggressive than ever in recent years. More recently, Celik and Urunveren
(2009) also showed that banking sector is monopolistically competitive in
Turkey.
Competition in the banking sector, is constituted by pricing and non-
pricing competitions while pricing component takes place in the loan and
deposit rates. However, non-pricing competition among banks is generally
measured by advertising strategies or branch size (see, for example, Stigler
(1968), Scott (1978), Kim and Vale (2001)). The determination of the strate-
gic branching policy has always been a popular subject for researchers. For
example, Kim and Vale (2001) examined the eects of branch size on banks'
extracting market power performance which was measured market share in
terms of total loans in Norway. They found that there is a positive relationship
between the market share of the bank for loans and its branch network, which
is measured by number of branches, while there is no relationship between
market size of the bank and its branch network. Calcagnini et al. (1999) ex-
amined the determinants of the banks' branching strategies in Italy and found
that existing market structure inuenced de novo branching.2 Moreover, they
1Concentration is a measure which shows how much of the total output in an industry
is produced by the largest rms in that industry. It is widely used as an indicator for
determining market structure.
2De Novo Branch means a branch oce of a bank which is originally established by the
bank and does not become a branch oce of the bank as a result of a merger transaction.
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showed that protable banks with larger number of workers per branch and
large amount of loans relative to deposits had more de novo branches. Carlson
and Mitchener (2005) analyzed the eects of branching policy of the banks on
the competition and the survival of these banks when there was a probable
crisis in the economy. They found that eects that branching had on com-
petition was quantitatively more important than geographical diversication
for the bank stability.
Turkish banking sector faced two major crises in 2000 and 2001. Before
2000-2001 crisis, banks in Turkey has mainly invested on government debt
instruments instead of private loans. Even in 2002, the share of government
debt instruments in their total assets was was around 42% for all banks in
Turkish banking market. This ratio decreased to 28% in 2008. However,
as it was mentioned before it changed signicantly in the post-crises period.
Banks in Turkey have not been nancing government debts as much as in the
pre-crises period instead, they concentrated on exercising core nancial inter-
mediation function, loan lending and deposit collecting, for private investors
and consumer since 2003. The regulatory environment of Turkish banking
industry had also changed. Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency of
Turkey (BRSA) was established in June 1999 and began to operate in Au-
gust 2000. Before this institution, the regulation and supervision of banking
system had a fragmented structure. This new independent authority has de-
veloped legal and institutional framework to increase supervision and audit
in the sector to make the sector more ecient and competitive.3
In Turkey, there is a strong link between nancial sector and whole econ-
omy.4 The banking sector comprises approximately 80% of the nancial sector
in Turkey (BRSA Report, 2009). According to the nancial reports of the
banks, total assets of Turkish banking sector increased about 75% between
3Source: http://www.bddk.org.tr/WebSitesi/english/About Us/About BRSA/5804BRSA-
Eng.pdf
4See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), King and Levine (1993), and Caprio (1998).
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the years 2001 and 2008. The share of total loans in total assets had increased
from 25% to 52% within the same period. Deposits that have been the major
sources of bank loanable funds kept their share in the total liabilities, i.e.
between 65% and 70%. Since Turkish banking sector made good progress in
this period, it is worth to analyze the impact of branching strategies to these
developments.
The number of branches of Turkish banks increased by almost 27% from
6,908 in 2001 to 8,790 in 2008. In fact, between the years 2001 and 2005,
number of branches of all deposit banks decreased about 10%. However, af-
ter 2005 it increased almost 30% till 2008. In addition to the increase in the
number of branches, both total loans and deposits per branch also increased
during this period. As stated in the site of TBA, total loans per branch
were 4.1 Million USD and reached to 27.3 Million USD in period 2001-2008.
Similarly, total deposits per branch increased from 11.7 Million USD in 2001
to 33.9 Million USD in 2008. Since 2005 foreign banks have entered heavily
to the Turkish banking sector by acquiring small banks. They opened many
branches relatively in a short period of time. The number of branches of
foreign deposit banks rised sharply from 209 to 2,034 in 2003 to 2008 pe-
riod. Pehlivan (2004) stated that marketing concept was an alien concept for
Turkish banks. Foreign banks however, came with their marketing strategies
and established their marketing departments. In a short time, Turkish banks
became aware of this concept and developed their own marketing strategy.
In the post-crises period, nancial intermediation performance of the
Turkish banking sector has been an interesting research area to investigate.
In this thesis, our main aim was to explain the eects of branch network size
to the nancial intermediation performance of the deposit banks. We used
changes in loans to GDP and deposits per GDP as proxies for the nancial
intermediation performance measures of the banks. In the rst model, we
examined the eects of branch network strategies to the lending performance
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of the banks. In this model, we hypothesized that there is a positive relation-
ship between the branch network size of banks and their total loans per GDP.
In the second model, we estimated the eects of branch network strategies
to the of deposit collecting performance of the banks. Similarly, we hypothe-
sized that there is a positive relationship between the branch network size of
banks and their total deposits per GDP. Both models were conducted for large
scaled versus small scaled banks and public versus private and large private
banks in Turkey. Large scaled banks are the largest seven banks in terms
of their asset size. Asset size of the largest bank in the small scaled bank
sample has evidently too small asset size. In this way, we aimed to explore
whether the impact of non-pricing behaviors of banks on the nancial inter-
mediary performances vary among dierent scaled and dierent ownership
type of banks in Turkey.
Although there are several other non-pricing behaviors in Turkish banking
sector, we only used the number of branches because of the limitation in
available data set. The banks were limited with the deposit commercial banks
since other type of banks such as investment and development banks have no
competitive behavior. They have few branches and give directed credits which
encourages investments without collecting deposits.
In Turkey, the banking sector is very dynamic in the sense that they
adapt new product and create alternatives immediately. Especially in the
credit card market, the dierenciation eorts of banks conrmed excessive
competition in this sector. They oer special credit cards that consist many
benets for their holders. For example, the cardholders are able to purchase
goods with installments without bearing any additional cost. They also oer
special discounts, gifts and assistance services via telephone. FlexiCard is
one of the credit cards with dierentiated specialties. It lets users to choose
the interest rate, rewards plan, fee and even the design on the card itself.
A client can pick a higher or lower interest rate and at the same time get a
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more or less generous bonus plan, and can decide how much of their annual
fee they want to pay with the bonus points they earn. Another non-pricing
eort is internet banking which was started to be used in late 1990s. Banking
operations become cheaper and faster for internet banking users. The banks
even started to use 3G technology recently. They send videos related to
daily market reports to their customers via this technology. In 2002, the
president and CEO of Garanti Bank, Ergun Ozen stated that \We [banks]
invest in technology and human resources much better than our competition;
this gives an edge in producing an unmatched level of services and product
range for our customers."
In our estimations to relate the impact of network of branches on the total
loans and deposits of the deposit banks during the period of 2003-2008. First,
we found that there is a positive and signicant association with the number
of branches and total loans per GDP for all banks except public banks. We
also observed positive impact of network branches on the total deposits per
GDP for all banks. The empirical ndings showed that by increasing the
branch network, a bank may collect more deposits per GDP. We also found
that banks are, in general, price elastic in the loans and deposits market. Only
for the large private banks, savers would not care much about the prices of the
deposits that they invest. It seems that they make their decisions according
to the non-pricing attributes of the banks. For example, large scaled banks
oer special type credit cards, dierent type of services such as tailor-made
solutions via private banking, using 3G technology to send economic reports
etc. Moreover, they may also trust to these banks more relative to small
scaled banks.
The remaining part of this study was organized as follows: Chapter 2
summarized the banking literature about non-pricing strategies of the banks.
Brief information about the Turkish banking sector was given in Chapter 3.
The empirical model was introduced in Chapter 4. Data set and methodol-
6
ogy were explained in Chapter 5. The empirical results were summarized in
Chapter 6 and the thesis was concluded in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The performance of a bank is signicantly related with the pricing character-
istics but it is not enough to explain completely the nancial intermediation
performance of the banks (Berger and Hannan, 1989). Banks' performances
are comprised of both pricing and non-pricing attributes of the banks. Non-
pricing behavior of a bank may take many forms. Scott (1978) examined
non-pricing competition in banking and took advertising and branching of
deposit banks as examples of non-pricing competition in imperfect markets.
Pinho (2000) studied non-perfectly competitive behavior in Portuguese bank-
ing market. He found evidence that interest rate and entry deregulation were
associated with an increase in both price and non-price competition in the
deposit market. Nowadays, the banks are imposing more importance to the
non-price characteristics such as branching strategies, special credit cards,5
Automated Teller Machines (ATM) networks, internet banking services or
personnel attributes.
In the literature, there are studies to describe the eects of the mar-
ket structure of the banking sectors to the competition intensity among the
banks. Frexias and Rochet (1997) showed that, the optimal choice of loan
and deposit volumes for banks in the perfect competition is the point where
5In Turkey, Fish card, Miles & Smiles, Wings Card are some of examples for special
credit cards that banks are using as non-pricing tools.
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the marginal prots are equal to the marginal management costs. If the
market is perfectly competitive, then the behavior of a bank does not aect
the market equilibrium. However, the market in which banks operate is not
a perfectly competitive market. As Bikker and Haaf (2000) showed for the
developed countries, banking markets are generally characterized as monop-
olistic competition. For the developing countries; Yeyati and Micco (2003)
and Gelos and Roldos (2002) found the same market conditions for banking
sector. In this market structure, there is sti competition between banks
because the number of banks may increase rapidly whilst total market share
is limited. Moreover, Panzar and Rosse (1987) introduced a measure called
H statistics which is a measure of competitiveness. This measure is obtained
as the sum of elasticities of gross revenue with respect to input prices.6 If
this statistics is negative, then it can be stated that this rm is operating in
a monopoly. The statistics will be positive but smaller than one when the
market is monopolistically competitive or it is equal to one when the market
is perfectly competitive. Similarly, Claessens and Laeven (2004) calculated
H statistics for banking sector in 50 countries including Turkey during the
period of 1994-2001. They found that H statistics lies between 0.60 and 0.80
suggesting market conditions of banking in these countries as monopolistically
competitive. De Bandt and Davis (2000) measured the competition for bank-
ing sectors in France, Germany and Italy by using interest income and total
income as pricing attributes of banks. They presented evidence that banking
6H statistics was rstly initiated by Panzar and Rosse in 1987. They constructed a
model
log TR = +
nX
i=1
i logwi +
kX
j
j logCFj + error
in which assumed n input and single output production where TR denotes total revenue,
wi is the i-th input factor and CF is other rm specic control k-factors. They suggested
that H statistics which can be calculated as: H=
nP
i=1
i is the sum of input price elasticities.
Thus it reects the competitive structure of the market. Moreover, they proved that H
statistics is negative for a neo-classical monopolist or collusive oligopolist, between 0 and
1 for a monopolistic competitor, and equal to unity for a competitive price-taking rm in
long-run competitive equilibrium.
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markets in these three countries are not perfectly competitive, rather they
are monopolistically competitive. Humprey and Rodriguez (2003) examined
Spanish banking market and showed that the market is imperfectly competi-
tive. The case in Turkish banking sector is also the same as the international
examples. Celik and Urunveren (2009) showed that, Turkish banking sector
is a monopolistically competitive market. In the banking sector, competition
is mainly composed of pricing and non-pricing competition as in most sec-
tor. However the competitive nature of banking industry compels banks to
use non-pricing tools intensively to dierentiate themselves to achieve higher
market shares.
In banking literature, there are many studies which are examining for the
price characteristics of the banks, namely the loan rates and deposit rates.
Barros (1995, 1999) used the dierences in the regional markets in Portugal
as a strategic variable in the bank loan and deposit pricing. He found that
there were higher levels of competition for deposit pricing than loan pricing
in Portugal banking sector. Similarly, Corvesier and Gropp (2002) found that
there was a high intensity of price competition for savings and time deposits
than pricing of loans and sight deposits. There are studies that indicate
stickiness of the prices in banking markets. For example, Hannah and Berger
(1991) argued that banks quoted interest rates for deposits are sticky in the
sense that they vary less than the market interest rates. They showed that
stickiness increases with market concentration. Berger and Udell (1992) found
that credit rates in US are also relatively sticky, in the sense that an increase
of one percent in the T-bill rate only leads to an increase of 0.5% of credit
rates. Since prices are, in general, sticky in the banking sector, consumers
would be more sensitive to non-pricing eorts.
In banking literature, studies on the non-pricing competition among banks
widely concentrated on the branching decisions and its eects to the banks.
For example, Zardhoohi and Kolari (1994) examined the branch level e-
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ciency in Finland. They showed that branch level eciency increased with
the number of branches in a network. Moreover, they found that this eect
leveled o if the network size was less or equal to ve branches. In order to
catch up optimum branch network size, they argued that the general trend
should be the consolidation in the banking industry. Scott (1978) claimed
that a rm increased its use of non-price competitive devices (branching and
advertising) as its market power initially increased from a low level. How-
ever, its use of non-price rivalry would eventually decreased as its market
power increased beyond some intermediate level as in US banking market.
Kim and Vale (2001) argued that in oligopolistically-competitive markets
such as in Norway, non price considerations may be the most important tool
by which rms dierentiated themselves and extracted market power. They
used branching decisions of the banks as a strategic behavior parameter and
showed that rival banks' reactions were aecting signicantly the branching
decision of the corresponding bank. They found that as the branch network
of a bank increased total loans supplied increased. Additionally, if rival's
branch network increased the amount of loan provided would decrease. Sim-
ilarly, Valverde et al. (2005) studied the same model introduced by Kim
and Vale (2001) both for loan market and deposit market in Spanish bank-
ing market. Rival behaviors in the loan and deposit market were also taken
into consideration. They found that branching strategy was more important
for deposit competition compared to loan competition in Spain. Cesari et al.
(2002) constructed a monopolistic competition model for the European bank-
ing system. They found that competition has become intensied especially
after deregulation. They argued that banks were choosing their branching
strategies according to the degree of competition on interest rates.
Dick (2003) examined the eects of the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act
which allowed for nationwide branching in US on various aspects of banking
markets and found that the increase in concentration in larger geographic
11
areas covering several states increased competition in the lending market.
Kim et al. (2007) examined Spanish banking sector for both savings banks
and private banks in order to measure the ideal branching strategy. They
found that for both bank types, opening new branches is ideal strategy both
for loan and deposit eciency. Dereli et al. (2007) explored the branching
strategy of one bank that operates in Turkey during the period 2005-2006.
They presented evidence that this particular bank used an estimation of ad-
ditional amount of potential deposit collected by this bank when she adds a
branch to her network. They also found that the critical components to es-
tablish branch are the level of national output (GDP) and public investments,
and the population of the relevant branch location
Hirtle (2007) found no systematic relationship between branch network
size and overall institutional protability in US during 2003:Q3. Moreover,
she claimed that there is a weak relationship between branch network size and
overall bank protability since the banks optimized the size of branch net-
work as part of an overall strategy both branch based and non-branch based
activities. She concentrated on small business loans, deposits and branch
network size as branch performance proxies and argued that previous studies
ignored the most recent technological innovations, i.e. the advent of internet
banking, the proliferation of automated teller machines and increasing num-
bers of call centers when they study the impact of branching. In this thesis,
we were unable to incorporate recent product and technology developments
in the Turkish banking sector due to unavailability of data. Although we
studied the xed eect estimation to accommodate these developments, the
results are not validated econometrically to report in this thesis.
There were also several studies on the non-pricing behavior of the banks
related to credit card market and ATM network (see for example, Rochet
and Tirole(2002), Matutes and Padilla (1994), Dick (2007), Nash and Sink-
ley (1997)). In Turkey, Akn et al. (2008) analyzed the non-price competi-
12
tion for the credit card market and found that in order to acquire market
power, banks bundle their cards with other banking services and dierentiate
themselves by providing a number of non-price benets to their credit card
customers. Moreover, they argued that general quality of bank services, dis-
tributing money points, travel miles and similar benets, enabling consumers
to pay shopping bills in installments and oering discounts to cardholders are
important factors for card choice of bank cardholders. Damar (2006) inves-
tigated whether shared ATM networks yields positive benets for banks by
increasing their productive eciency in Turkey. He argued that even though
it is possible to realize positive eects to the banks, there are multiple factors
that determine these benets. Mainly, these factors are geographical distri-
bution of shared ATM networks between urban and rural areas and level of
competition between banks.
In this thesis, we estimated the branching decisions on the banks' nan-
cial intermediation performance which we used the proxy of change in the
ratio of loans to gross domestic product and the ratio of deposit amounts
to gross domestic product for the intermediation performance. Using these
performance measurements, we constructed a model to study how branching
aected banks performances during the period 2003:1-2008:12. We classied
banks as large versus small scaled banks and public versus private and large
scaled private banks to identify variations of branching eects among banks
according to their ownership type or asset size.
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CHAPTER 3
TURKISH BANKING
SECTOR
In this chapter, there are three sections: In the rst section, general overview
of the Turkish banking sector since 1990s was presented. Financial crises
in 2000 and 2001 and their impact on the banking sector were summarized
in the second section. Lastly, banking restructuring program and branching
policy of the Turkish banking sector were reviewed.
3.1 Overview of Turkish Banking Sector
3.1.1 General Structure
Since 1990s, Turkish economy experienced several banking crises due to moral
hazard problems, huge public sector decits, high real interest rates, ex-
tremely risk taking behavior of banks, high ination and volatile economic
growth (Ertugrul and Selcuk, 2002; Kibritcioglu, 2005). During the period
1990-2001, while the average growth rate of GDP was around three percent,
the volatility (standard deviation) of the GDP growth rate was reaching six
percent which can be considered very simple evidence of instability in the
economy. The economy had been exposed to crisis in 1991, 1994 and 1998
(BRSA, 2009). The ratio of net debt of the public sector to GDP exceeded
14
60% within the same period. Moreover, overnight interest rates increased to
150% annually in 1994 and 2,300% in 2000.
Figure 3.1: Financial Sector in Turkey as of 2008 (Source: CBRT)
Macroeconomic and political risks have been impinged on Turkish banking
systems health. Nevertheless, the banking sector is still in development pro-
cess and has further growth potential. According to the Banks Association of
Turkey (TBA) (2009), the ratio of nancial assets consisting of bank assets,
bank shares and public and private borrowing instruments to GDP is 150%
in Turkey as of 2007 whereas this ratio is 246% for other developing countries
and 421% for the world. The main component of the Turkish nancial sec-
tor has been the banking system. The share of Turkish baking sector in total
assets of the Turkish nancial sector reached 88.5% as of December 2008 (Fig-
ure 3.1). The remaining part of the nancial sector, which is mostly owned
or aliated with the major commercial banks, consists of insurance compa-
nies, factoring companies, leasing companies, consumer nancing companies,
pension companies, intermediary institutions, investment funds, investment
partnerships and real estate investment partnerships. Although banks consti-
tute the major part of the nancial sector in Turkey, the size of the banking
sector is small as compared to developed countries even transition countries
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in the Central and Eastern Europe: The ratio of the asset size to GDP in-
creased to 77.1% as of 2008 from 62% as of 2000. The main reason that led
the sector to be inecient in terms of providing intermediation service can be
summarized as volatile macroeconomic environment, small capitalization of
the banks, weak risk and management applications, insucient audit mech-
anism and modern legal framework, full deposit insurance applications and
public banks which were dominating the banking sector (BRSA, 2009).
There were 56 commercial banks at the end of 1990. But only ve of them
had total assets of larger than 10 billion TL. These ve banks were composed
of 50% of the banking sector in 1990 and this ratio was kept its level even in
2000 (see Table 3.2, for CR5 in 2000). However, there was a notable increase
in 2001 and 2002 due to the failure of some banks and consolidation of public
banks in Turkey. There was 8 public deposit banks in 1990 while it decreased
to 3 in 2003 while total number of banks also decreased from 67 to 50 during
this period.
Since the number of banks decreased signicantly after 2002, market share
of the largest bank become relatively higher. More precisely concentration
ratio for ve largest banks did not change much and stabilized around 65%
for assets and deposits. On the other hand, the concentration ratio for the
branches started to decrease by 2005 suggesting more competition in terms
of branches. In 2005 by the announcement of Turkey as a candidate country
to European Union, signicant foreign entries to the banking sector occurred.
These banks entered the market by taking over the existing small private
banks with good branch network. As seen in Table 3.1 foreign deposit banks'
branches increased almost 10 times (from 209 to 2034) during 2003 to 2008.
Their heavy branching strategies are aimed to have higher market power
immediately in the sector.
According to HHI, CR3 and CR5 values, Turkish banking sector seems to
be more like \monopolistically competitive". Another interesting and notable
16
market structure is the existence of dominating large scaled, private and
public banks. As it will be seen in Table 5.1 and according to concentration
ratios in Table 3.2, public banks are among the largest banks in Turkey.
The loans share in the total assets of the banking sector had decreased
while the share of the securities increased sharply since 1990s till the twin
nancial crises in 2000 and 2001. The share of the securities in the total
assets were around 10% in 1990 and reached to 41% in 2002. On the other
hand, loans to asset ratio of banks decreased from 47% in 1990 to 23% in 2002
(Figure 3.2). As reported by BRSA (2009), \As a consequence of macroe-
conomic and political stability secured in 2002-2008 periods and appropriate
policies for banking sector, total assets of the sector grew with an annual
average of 23%. Owing to the fact that intermediation activities which are
the basic function of the sector could be concentrated on, loans became the
item displaying the highest increase throughout the period. In 2002-2008 pe-
riods, total loans grew with an annual average of 40%." As of 2008, the share
of loans in the total assets of the banking sector reached to 50% while the
securities ratio to the total assets decreased to 26% (Figure 3.2). As shown
in Figure 3.2 these ratios are clearly indicating that the crowding out eect
of the government decreased while the loans provided to real sector relatively
increased within this period.
During the twin crises, since the public sector debt requirement were in-
credibly high; Treasury had to sell its debt instruments with a very low ma-
turity and a high interest rate in order to nance public decits.7 In fact,
managers of the banks made economically rational choices and provided their
loanable funds to government as a riskless and very protable investment in-
stead of lending to real sector. Because the exchange rate regime was also
convenient to take currency risks in 2000,8 banks borrowed also foreign cur-
7An auction with a 28 days maturity and 144.23% interest rate was done in February
2001. Moreover, there were also auction announcements but did not happen due to no bids
oered by the investors.
8Due to the exchange rate based stabilization program launched in 2000, Central Bank
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Figure 3.2: Loans to Assets and Securities to Assets Ratios
rencies relatively with lower rates and invested to domestic government bonds.
At the beginning of 2000s, the net income of Turkish banks was heavily com-
posed by Treasury activities. As seen in Figure 3.3, it was still above 60%
of their net income as of 2002. It can be argued that the banking sector was
not fullling its main intermediary role well before 2002. However, the bank-
ing sector has been always producing higher rates of return. Its protability
was consistently three to ve times higher than the norms in most OECD
countries (McKinsey Global Institute Report, Retail Banking, 2003).
3.1.2 Regulatory Environment
The 1985 Banking Law (Bank Act No. 3182) was the rst major attempt to
regulate banking sector in Turkey. According to this law, Treasury was the
institution that was responsible for regulating the banking sector till 1999.
While Treasury was the responsible institution to regulate the sector, it was
also responsible to meet the day to day nancing needs of the government
of which are done through deposit banks generally. This duality was one
of the main causes of politicizing the banking supervision and regulation
pre-announced the exchange rate path and guaranteed these rates.
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Figure 3.3: Ratio of Prots Generated Through Securities
activities in Turkey. In 1999, a new act was launched, namely Banks Act No.
4389. Banking sector aimed to synchronize with the international banking
regulation standards. By this law, BRSA has been established which is an
independent council in order to monitor and regulate the banking sector.
However, this law also changed eight times till 2004. Lastly, a new Bank
Act was launched, namely Bank Act No. 5411 in late 2005. According to
international banking standards, this law can be considered as a modernist
law.
Explicit deposit insurance was introduced in Turkey in 1983. Initially, the
insurance fund oered a limited coverage for the depositors and funded by
premiums paid by the commercial banks. Later, it turned to full deposit in-
surance scheme during the 1994 currency crisis and blanket guarantee during
2000-2001 twin crisis.9 As emphasized in the literature extensively (see for ex-
ample Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and Demirguc-Kunt and Kane
(2002)), explicit insurance increases the risk attaching to the asset portfolios
of commercial banks. Moreover, full deposit insurance promotes signicant
9See Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaoval, and Laeven (2005) for details of insurance in Turkey
since 1983.
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moral hazard problems in the banking systems. As documented by Denizer
et al. (2000) and Ozyldrm and Onder (2008), Turkish banks undertook
excessive risks especially in the period with full government guarantee on de-
posits. Tanyeri (2010) stated that there was lack of transparency in the same
period.
In July 2000, as part of the disination program,10 government started
to phase out the full deposit insurance, by lowering the ceiling to 100 billion
TL.11 In July 2003, the BRSA announced that it would adhere to the full
deposit insurance, but that it would reduce the coverage to deposits that are
below 50,000 billion TL by July 2004, which was executed as planned. This
ceiling is broadly in line with the deposit guarantee in EU countries, whereby
the level of deposit protection varies between 20,000 euro and 60,000 euro,
however it is still high for Turkey, given that its average income per capita
is about one-fth of that in the EU. Moreover, ceiling covers over 90% of
the accounts by the number of accounts, but only about 60% by the size of
accounts.
3.1.3 Public Banks
Existence of dominating eect of public banks in the sector was one of the
discrepancies for the eciency in the banking sector. La Porta et al. (2000)
found evidence that there is a negative relationship between the degree of
government ownership of banks and overall economic growth and productivity
growth. In Turkey, the number of public banks declined from 12 in 1980 to
eight in 1990 and four in 1999. At the end of 1990s, bad policies of government
10An economic program documented in December 1999, which aimed to reduce ination
rate until the end of 2002.
11Licence of _Imar Bankas was revoked in June 2003 and its management also transferred
to Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). It was seen that the bank made o-the-record
transactions because there were dierences between the actual total deposit and the deposit
notied to public authorities. It is stated that this was a rare corruption example in the
banking history of the world. For _Imar Bank case, new resources was allocated since SDIF's
resources could not aord its cost. Deposit owners were paid a total amount of 8.6 billion
TL as end of 2008.
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Figure 3.4: Percentage Share of Public Banks' Assets in Total Assets
with the excessive risk taking of banks led public banks to over-branched and
over-staed (Zaim, 1995). Ziraat Bankas, Halk Bankas, Vakar Bankas
and Emlak Bankas12 were the public banks which dominated the banking
sector in 2000s, of which rst three of them are still operating as public bank
(see Table 3.1). As shown in Figure 3.4 their total assets share in the sector
was 40% at the end of 2002 while it was still high in 2008 which was around
30%.
The dominant share of public banks has distorted the ecient resource
allocation of banks in Turkey. As examined by Steinherr et al. (2004), the
personnel regime in the public sector deteriorated the production eciency
of public banks in Turkey until 2000-2001.
12Emlak Bankas was transferred to Ziraat Bankas in 2001 by the decision of BRSA.
In the same year, 96 branches which were transferred to Ziraat Bankas decided to be
transferred to Halk Bankas.
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3.2 2000 November-2001 February Crises and
the Banking Sector
Before 2000, Turkish economy faced crises frequently because of unsustain-
able debt dynamics and some structural problems in the nancial sector. As
of December 1999, a new exchange rate based economic program had been
launched to decrease ination rate, to get sustainable economic growth rate
and ensure the stability in the economy. The letter of intent was signed with
IMF as of December 9, 2000. It proposed a three-year stand by arrangement.
As highlighted by Akyuz and Boratav (2002), such programs generally lead
to currency appreciations and relying on capital inows attracts by arbitrage
opportunities to nance growing external decits. The program for Turkey
sets forth a determined exchange regime for one 18 months period. It was
programmed to be increased 20% of exchange rates for a year. This led banks
to take risks of being in short of foreign exchanges more easily. On the other
hand, ination rate targeted to be decreased. There were performance crite-
ria comprise of both primary surplus, privatization and both new and stock
external of debt. This program was also aimed to make structural reforms
on agriculture, pensions, scal transparency and tax administration. It had
an exit strategy in order to avoid the negative eects of determined exchange
rate regime (see Vegh 1992). Following 18 months, it designed to shift from
determined exchange regime to progressively widening band around a deter-
mined path to achieve a smooth transition the oating rate regime eectively.
At rst, this program received both public's and IMF's support and con-
dence. Moreover, since Turkey was announced to be an ocial member to
be considered for European Union enlargement net capital inow increased
notable. As capital inow continued, money market liquidity increased, and
overnight interest rates decreased signicantly (Figure 3.5).
On the other hand, since the interest rates had been decreasing, banks
24
Figure 3.5: Average Overnight Interest Rate in Interbank Market
were positioning aggressively themselves by purchasing more government
debts and engaging repo funding for short term nancing needs. Central bank
lending to the banks in the interbank market and also providing liquidity to
the market by purchasing government securities amounted approximately 4.3
billion USD. However, the net domestic asset ceiling was exceeded and the
net international reserve oor was reached. First, the loss of credibility of the
monetary authorities concerned the investors on the viability of the program.
Then, capital outows started to increase. The capital outows triggered
massive demand to foreign currencies led these capital to exit. Thus, liq-
uidity crisis occurred on November 2000. Since the program did not allow
interfering to interest rate, the interest rates raised sharply, i.e. overnight
interbank interest rates jumped to even 2,300% in 2000. Finally, IMF an-
nounced a 10 billion USD package in order to avoid any possible speculative
attack.
This program could not be able to match its aims because there were
some structural problems and fragilities on public nance and banking sector
in that period. In particular, banks exploited the arbitrage opportunities of
borrowing at low cost abroad and investing high-yielding government debt
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instruments. In expectation of further decline of interest rates due to disin-
ation, banks increased their long term xed-rate government debts. This
deteriorated the nancial position of the banks and raised their liquidity,
interest rate and currency risks. Additionally there was also political insta-
bility. The government could not be able to fulll some of the commitments
set by the program. For example, according to the program,13 21 public en-
terprises were supposed to privatized. Furthermore, regulatory measures of
the banking sector had been delayed.
Speculative attack to the currency and capital outow in November 2000
were overcome by a very high interest rate and loss of foreign exchange re-
serves and IMF credit amounting 7.5 billion USD. However, just after three
months later, a political dispute red another nancial crisis. This time it
was a currency crisis. As of 21st of February, interbank overnight interest
rate was 6,200%. Central Bank of Turkey's currency reserve decreased ap-
proximately 5.4 billion USD within a week. Since the Central Bank could not
survive to this attack exchange rate regime changed to oating rate regime
immediately.
Since banks faced two severe crises, their balance sheets were signicantly
deteriorated. Banks were obliged to be rehabilitated in order to have sound
banking system in Turkey. The fragmented regulation and supervision played
role in fragility of Turkish banks (Ozatay and Sak, 2003). In fact, SDIF
has been established in 1983 by Decree Law No. 70 of the Banking Law
and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey was empowered with its
administration and representation. With the amendment of Banks Act No.
4389, the government decided to set up an independent institute, BRSA,
to empower and manage SDIF in rehabilating failing banks after the twin
nancial crises. There were 25 banks transferred to the SDIF. Most of them
are consolidated under some banks which are also under the control of SDIF in
13Entire letter of intent is available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/1999/120999.htm
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order to manage easily. On the other hand, four of them were sold directly,
other four of them went to bankruptcy while one of them was transferred
to a public bank. Under new regulatory structure, SDIF has been done its
functions in a quick manner. The collections from the resolution of the SDIF
banks amounted to 18 billion USD as end of 2008, of which 90% was collected
by the end of 2004.
3.3 Restructuring Program and Branching
Strategies
Turkish banking sector faced major transformations after twin crises in 2001
and 2002. Since we examined the post-crises period, these major changes in
banking sector would be provided more extensively. Hence, in this section,
we, rst, explained the \Banking Sector Restructuring Program14" and then
described the branching strategies of Turkish deposit banks.
3.3.1 Banking Sector Restructuring Program
Following serious two crises experienced in 2000 and 2001, economic policies
changed, and the implementation of the policies were sent to the IMF as
a letter of intention on 31st July, 2001. This letter of intention expressed
the continuation of the economic reform program. The main goal of the
program was to decrease the ination rate to reach a more stable economic
environment and to enable a sustainable growth rate. In order to achieve
these goals; the banking sector was restructured. In May 2001, \Banking
Sector Restructuring Program" was initiated to restructure public banks, to
transfer the banks to SDIF of which distorts the stability in banking sector as
soon as possible, to support some private banks which were aected deeply
14See www.bddk.org.tr/WebSitesi/turkce/Raporlar/DigerRaporlar/15279C8914BD.pdf
for the full version of this program.
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Figure 3.6: Ratio of Matured Receivables to Loans
from the crises in order to reach a healthier banking system and lastly, to
strengthen the regulation and supervision framework in banking sector.
Jung (1986) emphasized that if real sector and nancial sector are in a
close relationship, a problem in one of these sector will spread to other sector
as well. Similarly, the companies were not able to pay back the credits in
Turkey because of the nancial crises occurred in 2000 and 20001. More
precisely, the ratio of matured receivables, the receivables that that have
come due, to loans has increased sharply from around 5% in 2000 to 23%
at the end of 2001 for deposit banks (Figure 3.6). In order to overcome
this problem, two applications were introduced in 2003 and 2007 named as
\_Istanbul Approach" and \Anatolian Approach" respectively.15
As mentioned above, the government removed the fragmented structure
in banking regulation and supervision, and established an independent body
15These applications were allowing companies to restructure their loan debts and ob-
taining new funding if necessary by the help of the Law 4743. One of them was called
_Istanbul Approach and was applied between 2002 and 2005. By this application, restruc-
tured loan amount was USD 5,960 million which was corresponding to 16% of total loan in
the banking system as end of 2002. Anatolian Approach was implemented in 2007 likely
_Istanbul Approach. However, by this approach, insolvent small and medium sized enter-
prises were targeted to be regained to the real sector. Its idea was also restructuring debts
these enterprises to nancial sector as well.
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which will be the sole authority in banking sector in 2000. Initially, The Un-
dersecretariat of Treasury was responsible for issuing banking regulations and
Central Bank of Turkey was responsible for o-site supervision and was man-
aging SDIF. Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency was established in
May 1999 and began to operate in August 2000, which has been the sole au-
thority in Turkish banking sector since then. By this way, regulation process
has been more transparent and the supervision system has been strengthened.
After 2000-2001 crises and especially restructuring of public banks, num-
ber of branches and sta had been reduced signicantly (BDDK, 2009).
Around 27% of the personnel retired as of September 2003. Moreover, al-
most 33% of the branches of public banks was closed. Around 50% of their
personnel transferred to other public institutions. The program also sug-
gested privatization of these banks. However, in the meantime, a special
regulation was published on November 22nd of 2000 to change the status of
the public banks as corporations. In Turkey, public banks are used to be
operating under dierent legal structure than private banks. This regulation
turned public banks to be operating as commercial banks in a more compet-
itive market and subject to same Banking Act. Despite none of the public
banks has been privatized since 2000, a merger occurred within these public
banks. All assets and liabilities of Emlak Bank transferred to Ziraat Bankas
on July 2001. After the merger, 96 branches of Emlak Bank transferred from
Ziraat Bankas to Halk Bankas within the same year.
The duty losses of public banks16 amounted 17.5 billion TL as of December
2001 was liquidated. Due to these losses including interest accruals, the
Treasury compelled to issue Special Issue Government Bonds amounting 22.9
16The rst time a duty loss occurred, it was recorded as a claim on the asset side of the
state banks' balance sheet. Interest accruing on that stock was shown as interest income
in the banks' prot and loss statement, even when no cash income was received from the
Treasury. Treasury compensated for the ow of duty losses fully within the year through
budgetary appropriations, and second, that it issued non-cash securities in exchange for
the stock of accumulated duty losses. This operation increased the net stock of domestic
debt. And this led Treasury to borrow more from the nancial markets, and concluded
crowding out eect for the loan lending mechanism in the banking sector.
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billion TL. Moreover, capital support amounting of 3.5 billion USD were
provided to strengthen the capital structure of the public banks.
As another eort to restructure commercial deposit banks, reporting stan-
dards changed to ination accounting.17 Thus the balance sheets of the banks
have become more transparent with the help of ination accounting.
By the \Banking Sector Restructuring Program," scal discipline and re-
quired legal framework were achieved. As stated by Rodrik (2009), \...Mon-
etary policy is governed by an ination targeting framework and an indepen-
dent central bank. Fiscal policy has been generally restrained and the public
debt-to-GDP ratio stable or declining. Banks have strong balance sheets,
and regulation and supervision are much tighter than before." As mentioned
before, banks in Turkey were mainly focused on the government debt instru-
ments in the pre-crises period. However, in the post-crises period banks are
not concerned with the prots gained by the government debt instruments
as much as pre-crises period, they concentrated more on customer needs and
main banking activities. These signicant changes contributed to stable and
high growth and decreasing real interest rate in Turkey. As it can be seen
from Table 3.3, Turkish banking sector increased its intermediary role in the
deposit and credit markets. According to the reports of TBA, total assets of
the banking sector, in nominal values increased from 250 billion TL (179 bil-
lion USD) in 2003 to 733 billion TL (464 billion USD) in 2008. Total amount
of loan provisions were also increased during the same period. Despite a slight
decline during global nancial crises, the amount of total loans reached from
49 billion TL (50 billion USD) to 367 billion TL (241 billion USD) as of 2008.
17Ination accounting is a kind of accounting which shows the eects of price changes on
the companys' assets and liabilities that were valued by the past costs. It was taken into
account in 1975 for the rst time and stood in international accounting standards which
made by International Accounting Standards Committee. Whatever the reason of rising on
the private and general price level, it was a non-related factor for the company. Rising of
general price level which was not related to company would eect the nancial statements
of the company badly. The company might have paid more tax than it had to be because
of higher ination. In Turkey, ination accounting application was started implementing
just after 2003. And this application was terminated by BRSA for the banking sector at
the beginning of 2005.
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Total amount of deposits collected were also increased steadily between these
periods. It increased approximately from 161 billion TL (115 billion USD)
to 455 billion TL (298 billion USD). Loans to deposits ratio increased from
0.30 to 0.81 suggesting that banks have been using more of their deposits as
credits. Overall, we can argue that intermediation performance of the banks
increased remarkably after 2000-2001 nancial crises in Turkey.
3.3.2 Non-Pricing Characteristics and Branching
Strategies
Since 2000, banks operating in Turkey have faced with more competition (see
also Table 3.2) and changed their pricing and non-pricing strategies on their
main banking activities. In particular, increasing competition has compelled
banks to oer similar prices for their loan sales and their deposit purchases.
Their eorts to gain competitive edge shifted to the non-pricing eorts. Some
of these eorts are brought new products to be introduced in the market. For
example; credit cards which have dierent attributes relative to competitors'
credit cards, internet banking activities with almost zero cost to customers,
wider branch and ATM networks and concepts.18 In several ways, banks
have been concentrated more on their non-pricing decisions. In the banking
practice, a good network of branches is considered as a major non-pricing
competitive tool to reach more depositors and borrowers. However, cost of
having wider branch network is considerably high. For example, Nath et al.
(2001) showed that in US banking market, the average transaction cost at a
full-service bank reduced from 1.07 USD to 0.27 USD at an
ATM, and fell to about a penny if the transaction was made on the web.
Similar to many countries, ATM and internet banking tools have been used
intensively as the means to collect deposits and provide loans in Turkish
18For example, some banks have shopping mall branch concept in which they have late
service hours.
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banking sector. Moreover, cellular phones have started to be used as newer
tool of lending. Banks advertise extensively that borrowers can apply for loan
by just entering their ID numbers and sending a message to the banks. They
commit to start the process immediately even in ve minutes.
Number of banks in the sector has stabilized around 50 banks since crisis
in 2000-2001 in Turkey. On the other hand, number of branches of the whole
banking sector increased from 5,966 in 2003 to 8,790 in 2008 (Table 3.7).
The number of ATMs19 increased almost 70% (12,857 to 21,970) during the
period of 2003 to 2008 (see Table 3.3 and Figure 3.7). Number of branches
per bank increased by 64% while it was registered as 88% for ATM between
2003 and 2008. The number of credit cards as one of the loan allocating
bank instrument was 19.9 million in 2003 and reached to 43.4 million in
2008. The trend in branching and availability of several innovative products
can be considered as the indications of increasing competition in the market
and the eorts of banks to reach more customers after the post-crises period
(Figure 3.7). The aggressive competition in the credit card market is also
worth to mention in Turkish banking sector. Banks have been trying to
dierantiate themselves by launching dierent attributed credit cards. For
example, Akbank made a strategic partnership with Boyner Holding and they
launched a credit card named as Fish Card. They dierantiate this card by its
most important specication which is giving so many gifts to its holders. On
the other hand, Yap ve Kredi Bank is the rst bank in Turkish banking sector
which oered credit cards to its customers in 1988. As of 2009, this credit
card has been the best card for 18 years in terms of sales turnover in credit
card market in Turkey. As mentioned before, banks have been involved in
the internet banking intensively since late 1990s. Number of customers that
used internet banking at least once reached to 13 million as 2009. Overall, in
a competitive banking sector in Turkey, we observe that it became a mandate
to use non-pricing tools and follow technological advancements intensively.19Number of ATMs are consists of banks which are subscribed to Int rbank Card C nter.
And they are representing almost whole banking sector.
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Figure 3.7: Number of Branches in Turkish Banking Sector (Source: TBA)
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CHAPTER 4
THE MODEL
In this thesis, we estimated the eect of non-pricing behavior on the perfor-
mance of the banking intermediation function. We used the loan amounts lent
per GDP and the deposit amounts collected per GDP by banks as a proxy
for the performance of the banking intermediation function. In order to ex-
plore the eects of non-pricing decisions to the performance of the banks'
intermediary function we controlled for the impact of lending and deposit
rates respectively. T-bill rate was also included in the model to control the
impact of alternative uses of banking funds. We used number of branches as
a non-price instrument. It was hypothesized that by increasing the number
of branches a bank increases its loan per GDP. Similarly, by increasing the
number of branches, a bank collects more deposits per GDP. Hence,
We specify our reduced form empirical models as;
log(Lit) = f [log(bit); log(r
l
it); log(r
g
t )] (4.1)
and,
log(Dit) = f [log(bit); log(r
d
it); log(r
g
t )] (4.2)
where i=1; 2; : : : ; n denotes banks, and t denotes quarters.
The equilibrium amount of loan per GDP (Lit) is a function of number
of the branch of the bank (bit), average loan rate (r
l
it) and Treasury bill rate
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(rgt ) (see appendix A for full description of the variables). Our hypotheses for
the rst model (equation 4.1) as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The loans per GDP for bank for bank i at time t would have
a positive relationship with the number of branches at time t. It is expected
to have that @Lit=@bit > 0.
Hypothesis 2: The loans per GDP for bank i at time t would have a
negative relationship with its loan rate at time t. It is expected to have that
@Lit=@r
l
it < 0.
Hypothesis 3: The loans per GDP for bank i at time t would have a
negative relationship with Treasury bill rate at time t. It is expected to have
that @Lit=@r
g
t < 0.
In the second model (equation 4.2), all the variables were the same ex-
cept that price variables would be deposit rates. Accordingly, the amount
of deposits collected per GDP was the independent variable. In this model
specication, our hypotheses for this model are as follows:
Hypothesis 4: The deposits per GDP for bank i at time t would have a
positive relationship with the number of bank branches. It is expected to
have that @Dit=@bit > 0.
Hypothesis 5: The deposits per GDP for bank i at time t would have
a positive relationship with its deposit rate. It is expected to have that
@Dit=@r
d
it > 0.
Hypothesis 6: The deposits per GDP for bank i at time t would have a
negative relationship with the rate of the Treasury bill rate. It is expected to
have that @Dit=@r
g
t < 0.
In addition to sample of all deposit banks, we tested our hypothesis for
large scaled versus small scaled banks and public versus private banks. Since
we estimated our regression by panel generalized method of moments, suf-
cient numbers20 of instruments were used. These instruments were mainly
20The number of instruments is equal or greater than the number of regressors.
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selected as the lagged values of the independent variable as in Arellona and
Bond (1991) and the level values of the dependent variables in the regression
equation. For all the estimation of the regression, we tested for the overiden-
tifying restrictions of the instruments by Sargan test which were reported in
the estimation results section.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
5.1 Data Set
In this thesis, we examined the performance of deposit banks between the
periods of January 2003 and December 2008 with quarterly data. During this
period, some of the operations such as mergers and/or acquisitions activities
made the data to be unbalanced. For example, a merger realized between
Kocbank and Yap ve Kredi Bank at the end of 2006. Moreover, Pamukbank
was transferred to SDIF in 2002 by BRSA. The bank continued its operations
until 2004 and transferred to a public bank, Halk Bank.
Since we aim to measure branch network eects on banks' loan and deposit
performance, we eliminated deposit banks that have very small network of
branches. More precisely banks that had less than 10 branches on average
for the period 2003 to 2008, were excluded from the data set21. In fact, these
banks are mostly the foreign banks that had only representative branches and
were operating in Ankara or _Istanbul.
There were 32 commercial deposit banks by the end of 2008. Six of these
banks are foreign banks as representative branches. They were excluded in
our analyses. Moreover, four banks were also eliminated since they had less
21Similarly, Hirtle (2007) stated that, she excluded the banks with less than 10 branches
since she was primarily interested in the performance of banks operating signicant branch
networks. The same argument is valid for this study also.
38
than 10 branches for the period 2003 to 2008. Hence, remaining 22 banks
were examined. The banks included in the sample were: Akbank, Alter-
natif Bank, Anadolubank, Citibank, Denizbank, Eurobank Tekfen Bank, Fi-
nansbank, Fortis Bank, HSBC Bank, ING Bank, Koc Bank, Pamukbank,
Sekerbank, Tekstil Bank, Turkish Bank, Turk Ekonomi Bankas, Turkiye
Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankas, Turkiye Garanti Bankas, Turkiye Halk Bankas,
Turkiye _Is Bankas, Turkiye Vakar Bankas, Yap ve Kredi Bankas (Table
5.1.). These 22 banks constitute 96% of the Turkish banking system as of
December 2008.
Our main information source was The Banks Association of Turkey.22
More precisely, the data related to total loans, total deposits, and number of
branches were gathered from the statistical reports of The Banks Association
of Turkey. Since the deposit interest rate and loan rates were not published
explicitly, these variables were compiled from the footnotes of the nancial
tables by using data query system of The Banks Association of Turkey.
Treasury bill rates were taken from the Undersecretariat of Turkish Trea-
sury. Treasury bill rate in the data set is the rate of which security has
the maximum amount of transaction on relevant day. The type of security
should have to be a discounted security according to the denition of the
Undersecretariat of Turkish Treasury.
GDP variable was obtained from CBRT. All relevant data are converted to
real values using consumer price index (base year of 2003) which is published
by Turkish Statistical Institute. We also adjusted the data for seasonal eects
by using X11 procedure in E-views. First, descriptive statistics for all deposit
banks are represented in Table 5.2. During the sample period, on average,
there were 334 branhes per bank. However, this number can be as high as
1,257 and as low as 12. As in all variables, we can observe variations among
22This institution was established in 1958 in order to preserve the rights and benets of
banks, to carry on studies for the growth of the banking sector, strengthening of competition
power and so on.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for All Sample Deposit Banks
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Number of Branches 334 223 1,257 12
Total Deposits (Million TL) 3,140 1,249 20,460 39
Deposit Rate (%) 4.09 3.57 13.17 0.49
Treasury Bill Rate (%) 5.03 4.36 14.01 1.67
Total Loans (Million TL) 2,025 1,000 12,173 3
Loan Rate (%) 5.92 4.93 16.15 1.04
Note: All of the variables, except number of branches, are in real values.
banks in the sample.
Table 5.3 represents the summary statistics for large scaled and small
scaled deposit banks used in our regressions respectively. Large scaled banks
were determined according to their asset sizes. There are seven banks as large
scaled bans: Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankas, Turkiye Garanti Bankas,
Turkiye Halk Bankas, Turkiye _Is Bankas, Turkiye Vakar Bankas, Yap ve
Kredi Bankas, and Akbank (see Table 5.1). The largest of the small scaled
bank's asset value (16.5 billion TL) was twice smaller that the smallest of the
large scaled bank's asset value (31.8 billion TL) in nominal values as of end
2008. Comparing the summary statistics, one of the main dierences between
the large scaled and small scaled banks was the number of branch. Mean of
the number of branch was 702 for large scaled banks while even maximum
value of number of branch for small scaled bank was only 457. Similarly,
it was observed that there were considerable dierences between the total
loan and total deposit amount variables. On the other hand, both loan rates
of small scaled versus large scaled banks and deposit rates are very similar
during the sample period. These descriptive statistics suggest that banks
have few eld for pricing competition while they have more opportunities to
compete with their rivals via their non-pricing competition eorts.
Descriptive statistics for private and public banks are represented in Table
5.4 respectively. During the sample period, on average, the intermediation
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics for Large and Smalle Scaled Banks
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Large Scaled Deposit Banks
Number of Branches 702 627 1,257 329
Total Deposits (Million TL) 8,130 7,639 20,460 2,579
Deposit Rate (%) 3.49 3.06 13.17 0.74
Total Loans (Million TL) 4,710 3,784 12,173 328
Loan Rate (%) 6.16 4.99 14.96 1.82
Small Scaled Deposit Banks
Number of Branches 139 140 457 12
Total Deposits (Million TL) 913 683 4,029 39
Deposit Rate (%) 4.37 3.77 12.81 0.49
Total Loans (Million TL) 828 484 4,385 3
Loan Rate (%) 5.82 4.90 16.15 1.04
Note: All of the interest rates and monetary values are in real values.
spread for public banks was higher as compared to private banks. Public
banks asked higher loan rate while they oered lower deposit rate on average.
On the other hand, lending rate for private banks are, on average, one per-
centage point lower than the average lending rate by public banks. Moreover
the deposit rates by private banks were 0.6 percentage point higher than the
rates by public banks. In terms of bank branches or non-pricing dierences,
it can be observed that the network of branches by public banks was almost
three times larger than private banks. However, when we classied private
banks as large private banks, the dierence in non-pricing characteristics al-
most disappeared. Median branch size for large private banks was even higher
as compared to public banks. Another notable dierence was the lending and
deposit rate for large private banks were smaller than the rates by an average
private bank in Turkey.
5.2 Methodology
We used panel data estimation methods in our analysis. In panel data, adding
the time period to the cross sectional dimension to the data were would help
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics for Private and Public Banks
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Private Banks
Number of Branches 260 185 1,028 12
Total Deposits (Million TL) 2,253 994 15,497 39
Deposit Rate (%) 4.18 3.68 12.81 0.49
Total Loans (Million TL) 1,840 723 12,173 3
Loan Rate (%) 5.78 4.88 16.15 1.04
Public Banks
Number of Branches 756 595 1,257 356
Total Deposits (Million TL) 8,471 7,238 20,460 2,579
Deposit Rate (%) 3.58 3.05 13.17 0.74
Total Loans (Million TL) 3,140 2,595 7,696 328
Loan Rate (%) 6.75 5.64 14.96 2.32
Large Private Banks
Number of Branches 662 640 1,028 329
Total Deposits (Million TL) 7,836 7,931 15,497 3,134
Deposit Rate (%) 3.42 3.13 8.73 0.82
Total Loans (Million TL) 6,059 6,299 12,173 1,558
Loan Rate (%) 5.66 4.74 13.26 1.82
Notes: All of the interest rates and monetary values are in real values.
to make better econometric estimations (Gujerati, 2004). The possibility of
collinearity was lower and higher degrees of freedom which led to make better
econometric inference from the data set. In the panel data analyses, it can
be easier to answer some of the questions of which you could not answer with
either time series or cross-sectional data. Furthermore, panel data are related
to individuals over time, there was bound to be heterogeneity in the banking
units in our analysis (Gujarati, 2004).
The basic form of panel data could be stated as
yit = x
0
it + z
0
i + it (5.1)
In this specication, there were K regressor in x0it and no constant term.
On the other hand, the heterogeneity was stated as, z0i, which contains con-
stant and as group variables. This model was specied as classical regression
model. But if z0i was observed for all individuals then the entire model could
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be treated as an ordinary linear model and t by least squares.
In general, using panel data estimation methods are summarized as pooled
least square, xed eect, random eect or panel generalized methods of mo-
ment methods and dynamic panel data models estimations. There are condi-
tions need to be satised in order to make estimations by pooled least square
method. If z0i in equation were contained only a constant term then the ordi-
nary least square would provide ecient and consistent estimates of the com-
mon intercept and the slope (). This is called as pooled regression model.
Baltagi (2005) stated that the appropriate technique depends upon the struc-
ture of the error term, it, and the correlation between the components of the
error term and the observed determinants of the dependent variable. As
Pandey (2005) emphasized that pooled least square method was useful, if
there was no bank specic or time specic eects were anticipated. However,
Hausman test conrmed that data set consists of bank specic eects as ex-
pected. This unobserved bank specic eects would have an impact on our
dependent variables; i.e, total loans and total deposits. Both xed eects and
random eects estimation techniques handle with unobservable factors. How-
ever, there are dierent assumptions for applying these methods. Fixed eect
method is the method where the unobserved eect depends on the time and
xed factors for all banks. In the random eect model, the unobserved eect
for each section is not xed, but has random parameters. So random eect
model assumes that each bank diers in its error terms. In our model speci-
cations xed eect model was found more appropriate method by using the
Hausman test as emphasized by Wooldridge (2001), the time-varying errors
must have zero means, constant covariances, and zero correlations in com-
paring random eect and xed eect. This implies that the strict exogeneity
assumption is crucial for consistency of the xed eect estimator. However,
it was not satised by our data set and the model specication. Hence, a gen-
eralized method of moments procedure can be more ecient than the xed
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eect estimator (see also Wooldridge, 2001). We used instrumental variables
in order to overcome this problem in estimation by panel generalized method
of moments (GMM). The instruments were the lagged values of dependent
variables and level values and of independent variables.
In the following sections, we will summarize general specications for xed
eect and random eect estimation and panel generalized method of moments
estimation techniques respectively.
5.2.1 Fixed Eect Models
In xed eect models, slope coecients, which were shown as  do not change
but the intercepts dier according to the cross sectional data. In our study it
is assumed that it will change according to the banks. While the intercepts
were assumed to be special for each bank, it might not change over time. So,
these models were named as \xed eect models".
The xed eect models can be stated as,
yit = x
0
it + i + it (5.2)
where i = z
0
i. In this xed eect approach, i was considered as group-
specic constant term. The term \xed" was used to mention that the term of
i does not vary over time. Moreover, unobserved variable, z
0
i was correlated
with x
0
it.
Fixed eect models may have some disadvantages. In this type of model
specications, there are too many dummy variables which might lead to insuf-
cient number of degrees of freedom in order to have powerful statistical tests.
In addition, too many variables in a model might also cause multicollinearity
which increases the standard errors and it may lead to decrease in the sta-
tistical power of the test parameters in the model. Moreover, since there is
the assumption of homoscedasticity and no autocorrelation in the residuals,
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there could easily be bank-specic heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation over
time which was observed in the trials of this estimation method.
5.2.2 Random Eect Models
In random eect models, the unobserved individual heterogeneity, z
0
i, was
assumed to be uncorrelated with x
0
it. Hence, random eect models can be
represented as
yit = x
0
it + E[z
0
i] + z
0
i  E[z
0
i] + it (5.3)
= x
0
it +  + ui + it (5.4)
In the equation above, ui was representing group specic random eect.
This variable was similar to it, but it was entered to the regression for all
period. This individual random error was constant over time and specic to
each bank: E[u2i jxi] = 2i . The random error, it, was specic to particular
observation. For ui to be properly specied, it ought to be orthogonal to the
individual eects. On the other hand, in this type of model specications,
it was assumed that both ui and it are distributed normally: it  N(0; 2 )
and ui  N(0; 2u). Moreover, there was no relation between the individual
error terms, ui, and with the panel error term, it.
E[uiit] = 0 and E[uiuj] = 0:
where i and j denote dierent banks in our model.
According to the results of Hausman tests reported in Table 5.5, we found
that all the variables were exogenous and no endogenity problem was ob-
served.
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Table 5.5: Hausman Endogeneity Test
Variables Probability
Branch 0:73
Loan Rate 0:56
Deposit Rate 0:65
T-Bill Rate 0:77
5.2.3 Panel Generalized Method of Moments
The general statement of our model specication is as follows:
yi;t = x
0
i;t + i + i;t (5.5)
where i was the bank specic constant term which does not change through
time. In order to eliminate i, we took rst dierences of the variables:
yi;t   yi;t 1 = [xi;t   xi;t 1]0 + i;t   i;t 1 (5.6)
where t = 2; 3; : : : ; T; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
Since i;t   i;t 1 is independent of xi;t and xi;t 1, it is allowed to choose
xi;t or xi;t   xi;t 1 as instruments.
Thus, the model would be stated as
yi = X
0
i + ui: (5.7)
This equation is a general statement of the transformed panel generalized
method of moment of model estimation. Moreover, let Zi be the matrix of
instruments used. Then, E[Ziui] = 0 and i = 1; 2; : : : ; N:
More precisely, the dependent variable yi , stands for the logarithm of the
total loan amount per GDP for bank i or total deposits collected per GDP
for bank i. X
0
i represents the dependent variables used in the empirical model
such as loan rates or deposit rates for banks, number of branches of a bank
and the Treasury bill rates.
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The regression estimation via generalized method of moment needs in-
strumental variables, transformation technique and a selection of weighting
matrix. As Hayakawa stated (2009), it is common practice not to use all
instruments since it is well known that using too many instruments deterio-
rates the nite sample behavior, especially, the bias of the GMM estimator.
Since lagged values of the dependent variables are most widely used as in-
strument variables in empirical studies. As mentioned above, we used lagged
values of the dependent variable and independent variables as instruments.
All the instruments we used are level data, not their natural logarithms as
used in original model equation. The instruments should be both relevant and
valid: correlated with the endogenous regressors and orthogonal to the errors.
Hence, we test the over-identifying restrictions in order to provide evidence of
the instruments' validity. Using Sargan Test it seems that instruments were
valid for both models (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.2).
Hayakawa (2009) proved that in the panel generalized method of moment
estimation forward orthogonal was more ecient than rst dierence transfor-
mation technique which was suggested rstly by Arellano and Bover (1995).
Although, both of these techniques could have been used, we used forward
orthogonal deviation since it was found more ecient. The optimal weighting
matrix can be chosen to minimize the mean squared error of the estimator.
Since we selected orthogonal deviation in order to eliminate unobserved eect,
we chose weighting matrix for GMM estimation as \White-period Arellano
Bond n-step" which gave the minimum mean squared error. As a result,
since the most ecient and consistent results were found by panel general-
ized method of moments and selecting relevant instruments, weighting matrix
and transformation technique, we report their estimation results in the next
chapter. However, we have also xed eect estimations in Appendix C.
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CHAPTER 6
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this chapter, we summarized the empirical results for loan and deposit
models described in chapter 5. First, we presented results for all banks.
Then, we presented the estimation results for small scaled versus large scaled
deposit banks and public versus private deposit banks. Thus, we tried to
understand whether banks with dierent size and dierent ownership type
structure in Turkey have dierent non-pricing behavior during the period of
2003-2008.
6.1 Empirical Results For All Deposit Banks
We estimated both loan and deposit per GDP models using 22 banks in the
sample. In the rst columns of Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, it can be seen that
coecients of pricing and non pricing eects were conrmed the hypothesized
relationships. More precisely, it was found that loan rate and loan amount
had negative and signicant relationship during the sample period. Increasing
lending rates might lower the amount of bank loan provision per GDP since
loans per GDP were found to be elastic to lending rates after post-crisis
period in Turkey. Similarly, non-pricing factors were found to be signicantly
inuencing the loan provisions per GDP for all deposit banks. There were
signicant and positive relationship between the number of branches of a bank
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and the total amount of loans provided per GDP. Lastly, in the sample of all
banks, it was found that there was no systematic relationship between the
ratio of loans to GDP and Treasury bill rate. This relation may suggest that
during the post crisis period, deposit banks in Turkey changed their asset
management strategies to investing on loans instead of government bonds.
In the second model, we estimated the eect of number of bank branches
on the amount of total deposit collected per GDP using whole sample. As seen
in the rst column of Table 6.2, the ndings were conrmed the hypothesis
4 to 6 described in the chapter 5. Firstly, we found that number of branch
was signicantly associated with the amount of total deposits per GDP. This
results conrmed nding by Dereli et al. (2007) in which Turkish banks locate
branches according to potential for deposit growth. Our result suggested that
banks might increase their sources of loanable fund by having larger network
of branches. Overall, non-pricing factors were found to have association on
both loans and deposits per GDP for all commercial deposit banks during the
sample period. Moreover, total amount of deposit per GDP were found to be
positively and signicantly related to deposit rates. The pricing impact can
also be observed in the coecient of Treasury bill rate. We found that there
was a negative and signicant relationship between the Treasury bill rate and
the amount of deposits collected per GDP. This result suggested that bank
deposits and government bonds can be considered as substitutes for investors
in Turkey. It seems that savers were found to invest less on deposit contracts
if yields on government bonds increased.
6.2 Empirical Results for Large Versus Small
Scaled Banks
As seen in Table 5.1, banks in Turkey can be classied as large and small
scaled easily. In our sample, there are seven large scaled and 15 small scaled
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banks. As summarized in Table 5.3, these banks with dierent asset group
had dierent non pricing and pricing behaviors. By classifying these banks
according to asset size, we aimed to understand how pricing and non-pricing
variations were related to intermediation performances of these banks during
the sample period. The empirical ndings of the factors that were inuencing
loans per GDP for large scaled banks and small scaled banks were presented
in the second and third columns of Table 6.1. It seems that lending rate and
number of branches were positively and signicantly related to the amount of
loan provisions per GDP. Since increasing network of branches had positive
impact on loan sales of small and large scaled banks, our results suggested
that there was no behavioral dierence in the branching strategies of these
banks. The major dierence among large and small scaled banks was how
these banks' loans were related to the yield on government debt instruments
during the sample period. If Treasury bill rate increased, the cost of capital
would increase as well. This might create liquidity problem for the banks to
match their loan demands. The results suggested that only the large banks,
especially large private banks, can aord loan lendings in such a situation in
the economy. The remaining four public large banks have dierent aims and
objections while making loan lending decisions such as supporting farmers or
small and medium sized enterprises. Hence, the impact of T-bill rates on the
loan amounts by these banks were found to have no signicant association
(see column 5 of Table 6.1).
In column 2 and 3 of Table 6.2, the empirical ndings that relate the
amount of deposits per GDP and pricing and non-pricing behaviors of large
and small scaled banks were presented. Our results conrm that increasing
the number of available branches would have positive and signicant impact
on deposits collected by large and small scaled banks. We found no signi-
cant impact of increasing deposit rates on the total deposit per GDP of large
scaled banks. By increasing deposit rates, large scaled banks were not able
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to increase their sources of banks in Turkey. It seems that large scaled bank
customers' main priority might not be monetary reward from their savings.
For example, they may care more on the brand image, the trust and con-
dence that bank gives to the customer or other non-pricing services provided
by these banks. However, we found that customers of the small scaled banks
cared about the deposit rates oered by these banks. We can argue that
deposits were price elastic for small scaled banks during the sample period.
As it was hypothesized, there was a negative and statistically signicant re-
lationship between Treasury bill rate and the deposit amounts collected for
large scaled banks. Because investors were willing to invest more on Trea-
sury bills and government bonds when their return are higher rather than
investing on deposits. This negative relation was also valid for small scaled
banks but it had insignicant impact. Overall, empirical evidence showed
that non-pricing characteristics of both small and large scaled banks played
statistically signicant role in the collection of deposits.
6.3 Empirical Results for Private Versus
Public Banks
In this section, we presented results for public, private and large scaled pri-
vate banks. The estimations made for these subsamples in order to measure
the impacts of branching among the dierent ownership structures of the
banks. We found signicant dierences between both pricing and non-pricing
behaviors in both deposit and loan estimations among these samples.
The empirical results of loan estimations for public, private and large
scaled private banks were presented in the columns of 4, 5 & 6 in Table
6.1. In all these banks, loan rates were negatively and signicantly related to
loan amount per GDP. However, it seems that the impact of branches on the
amount of loans provided diers for public and private banks. More precisely,
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number of branches did not have any signicant impact on the loan amount
per GDP for public banks while it had signicantly positive eect for the
private banks. As it was mentioned before, public banks have dierent aims
and objections in Turkey. For example, they Ziraat Bankas established to
give loans to farmers and Halk Bankas to small and medium sized enterprises
in order to support them in accordance with government policies. They have
already extensive branch network. Hence, increasing branch network had no
signicant change in their loan provisions. Moreover, we observed signicant
and positive association between bill rate and the loan amount per GDP for
large private banks and public banks while this relation was not valid for
private banks. It should be noted that most of the banks in the sample of
private banks are also in the small scaled bank sample.
In columns 4 to 6 in Table 6.2, the results for deposit estimation of pub-
lic, private and large scaled private banks were presented respectively. The
results conrmed that there is a positive and statistically signicant relation-
ship between number of branches and total deposit per GDP in any type of
banks. However, there was no signicant relationship that was observed be-
tween deposit rate for both public and large scaled private banks. As it was
mentioned in the previous section, customers of large scaled banks do not care
much about the prices of their deposit contracts. These results also suggest
that their main concern is trust and non-pricing benets they may obtain. It
is notable that the estimated results for deposit per GDP for public banks
were similar to large scaled banks. It shows that large scaled banks' deposit
rates are elastic due to their successful non-pricing eorts. Because investors
would prefer to invest on government debt instruments as its interest rate
increases compared to deposit rates, Lastly, Treasury bill rate had negative
impact on the deposit amount per GDP for all bank types.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This thesis aims to explore the eects of non-pricing strategies, namely branch
network eects, of the Turkish deposit banks to their nancial intermedia-
tion function performance in the period 2003-2008. Turkish banking sector
has gone through a restructuring program after the twin nancial crises in
2000 and 2001. The eect of restructuring program on the banking sector
began to be experienced in the beginning of 2003. In order to measure the
impacts of the branching eorts of deposit banks to their intermediation per-
formance, we started our sample data from 2003 and ended at the end of
2008. Because the global nancial crises in 2007-2008 also distorted if we
included the period 2009 on our analysis. Thus, the period 2003-2008 can be
argued to be a suitable period to investigate the eects of the branch network
eect to the intermediation function of the banks. After 2000-2001 crises, all
banks including public banks are restructured, recapitalized and standardized
their reporting internationally. The regulatory environment has also changed
signicantly.
Market structure of the Turkish banking sector was moderately concen-
trated. As a result, banks are the players who were aecting market by their
both pricing and non-pricing strategies in the market. In general, non-pricing
strategies of banks consist of advertising, branch network, ATM network, cus-
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tomer relationship, internet banking, we only used branch network due to data
unavailability.
Using unbalanced panel data, we did regressions by panel generalized
method of moments in the estimations of total loan amount and total deposit
amount for commercial banks in Turkey that had more than 10 branches on
average. We also regressed some model for large scaled versus small scaled
banks and public versus private banks in order to examine whether there are
dierences among these banks in terms of their branching strategies.
Our ndings reveal that not only pricing strategies but also non-pricing
strategies were played critical roles in the intermediation performance of the
Turkish banks. As a result of having extensive network of branches banks
would extract higher market power relative to their competitors in a compet-
itive market environment.
In the estimation of the loan performances of the banks regressions, ex-
cept public banks, we found statistically signicant impact of branch network
strategies. This result conrmed that public banks' visions and missions in
Turkey is dierent than private banks. Similarly we also found that there was
a positive and statistically signicant relationship between number of branch
and total deposit share in the GDP for all banks.
Because there was no statistically signicant relationship between the total
deposit share in the GDP and deposit rate for both large scaled and large
scaled private banks samples, empirical results suggest that investors who
prefer large scaled banks did not care much about the rate dierences with
the competitor banks.
As the law of demand suggests, average lending rate was found statisti-
cally and negatively associated with the loan share in the GDP for all samples.
Moreover, there was a signicant dierence in the T-bill rate coecients for
the small scaled and large scaled banks. In the estimation of loan share for
the large banks, including public banks and large scaled private bank sam-
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ples, showed that there was positive and statistically signicant relationship
between the T-bill rate and loan shares in the GDP.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTION OF
VARIABLES
Log of Loans to GDP Ratio: This variable was used as a dependent vari-
able. It was computed by taking natural logarithm of ratio of nominal values
of total loans to nominal seasonally adjusted GDP. Total loan variable was
obtained from the balance sheets of the banks that are reported by The
Banks Association of Turkey while GDP was reported by the Central Bank
of Turkey.
Log of Deposits to GDP Ratio: This variable was also used as a de-
pendent variable. It was computed by taking natural logarithm of nominal
values of total deposits to nominal seasonally adjusted GDP. Total deposit
variable was obtained from the balance sheets of the banks (www.tbb.org.tr).
Log of Treasury Bill Rates: This variable is the arithmetic average of
daily interest rates of the discounted Treasury bill rate which had the most
transaction volume in _Istanbul Stock Exchange. This variable is reported in
_Istanbul Stock Exchange (www.imkb.gov.tr) and Undersecretariat of Turk-
ish Treasury (www.hazine.gov.tr). It was calculated by taking the natural
logarithm of this arithmetic average of daily interest rates.
Log of Loan Rates: This variable is average interest rate of the all types
of loans provided by banks. These rates were obtained from the database of
66
The Banks Association of Turkey. It was calculated by taking the natural
logarithm of the loan rates.
Log of Deposit Rates: This variable is average interest rate of all types of
oered by banks These rates were obtained from the database of The Banks
Association of Turkey. It was calculated by taking the natural logarithm of
the deposit rates.
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APPENDIX B
ESTIMATION RESULTS BY
USING OVERNIGHT RATES
In the original estimations, presented in the estimation, we used Treasury bill
rate in order to encounter the alternative uses of funds. In general, banks may
prefer to invest on interbank money market as alternative to loans or, banks
may borrow from other banks instead of households. In Table B.1 and B.2 the
estimation results for both loans and deposits of which interbank overnight
rates were presented. We also estimated by using both Treasury bill rate
and interbank overnight rates for loans and deposits equations. Those results
were presented in Tables B.3 and B.4 respectively. Similar to our previous
models, the relationship between branching and loans provisions and deposit
collection was found to be positively related for all banks except public banks.
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